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ANATOMY OF RELATIONSHIP
SIGNIFICANCE: A CRITICAL
REALIST EXPLORATION
Filipe J. Sousa and Luis M. de Castro
ABSTRACT
Markets-as-networks (MAN) theorists contend, at least tacitly, the
signiﬁcance of business relationships to the ﬁrm – that is, business
relationships contribute somewhat to corporate survival or growth. One
does not deny the existence of signiﬁcant business relationships but sustain,
in contrast to the consensus within the MAN theory, that relationship
signiﬁcance should not be a self-evident assumption. For signiﬁcance
cannot be a taken-for-granted property of each and every one of the ﬁrm’s
business relationships. The authors adopt explicitly a critical realist meta-
theoretical position in this conceptual paper and claim that relationship
signiﬁcance is an event of the business world, whose causes remain yet
largely unidentiﬁed. Where the powers and liabilities of business relation-
ships (i.e., relationship functions and dysfunctions) are put to work,
inevitably under certain contingencies (namely the surrounding networks
and markets), relationship effects ensue for the ﬁrm (often beneﬁts in
excess of sacriﬁces, i.e., relationship value) and as a consequence
relationship signiﬁcance is likely to be brought about. In addition,
relationship signiﬁcance can result from the dual impact that business
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relationships may have on the structure and powers and liabilities of the
ﬁrm, that is, on corporate nature and scope, respectively.
1. INTRODUCTION
Markets-as-networks theory (henceforth ‘‘MAN theory’’), also referred to as
industrial networks theory, aims to describe and explain the vertical interact-
ions and relationships established and maintained between ﬁrms, in the role
of buyers and sellers. This theory is the notorious offspring of the voluminous
analytical and empirical work undertaken almost over the past four decades
by the Industrial Marketing and Purchasing Group (frequently referred to as
‘‘IMP Group’’ or simply IMP), a worldwide research community dedicated to
the study of interﬁrm or business relationships and networks (McLoughlin &
Horan, 2000; Turnbull, Ford, & Cunningham, 1996).
Although clearly not monolithic, MAN theory features at least three major
conceptual cornerstones: the existence, connectedness, and uniqueness of
business relationships (Hakansson & Ostberg, 1975); business relationships
as a third type of governance structure, alternative to both hierarchies and
markets (Hakansson & Johanson, 1993b); and the signiﬁcance of business
relationships to the ﬁrm, henceforth ‘‘relationship signiﬁcance’’ (Gadde,
Huemer, & Hakansson, 2003). This conceptual paper is exclusively concerned
with the last of these cornerstones, in particular with the identiﬁcation of the
causes eventually bringing about relationship signiﬁcance.
The signiﬁcance of a business relationship exists in relation to a particular
entity, for example, the ﬁrm, supplier A or customer B. One needs to oppose
to the (more or less dominant) view among MAN theorists that relationship
signiﬁcance should be considered in and of itself, that is to say, business
relationships are signiﬁcant per se and not for a speciﬁc entity. It seems
however senseless to think of relationship signiﬁcance in abstract. For
whenever the signiﬁcance of something or of someone is presumed, a
question immediately arises: ‘‘signiﬁcant to whom?’’ That one considers here
the signiﬁcance of business relationships to the ﬁrm (i.e., adopts the ﬁrm’s
viewpoint) looks appropriate at least if one acknowledges that ‘‘relation-
ships areyan important structural dimension [of the business network]
as fundamental as organisations themselves’’ (Ford & Hakansson, 2006b,
p. 252). This viewpoint should not be equated with the ‘‘ﬁrm-centred view
of the world’’ or the ‘‘single-ﬁrm perspective’’ so commonly found in
management theory, whereby the ﬁrm is presumed to be an atomistic entity
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concerned solely with own objectives and interests and having complete
discretion in behavior. Although MAN theory usually endorses the
perspective of the focal business relationship or the focal business network,
the ﬁrm’s viewpoint needs not be at odds with a ‘‘relative world’’ within
which interﬁrm interaction predominates (Easton & Hakansson, 1996). But
what is relationship signiﬁcance is all about?
Relationship signiﬁcance pertains to ‘‘the inﬂuence of business relation-
ships on corporate survival or growth.’’ That one is sticking to the meaning
as often assumed by MAN theorists, and not advancing a putative one, is
supported by Hakansson and Snehota’s (1995, p. 267) words: ‘‘In order to
survive and develop you have to have counterpartsy.’’ Ford and Hakansson
(2006a, p. 22) convey the same: ‘‘Companies can choose if and how they want
to do something particular relative to a speciﬁc counterpart. But they cannot
choose whether or not to have relations with others, including their suppliers
and customers.’’ Blois (1998, p. 256) goes even further, by stating that ‘‘it is
impossible for ﬁrms not to have [vertical] relationshipsy .’’ The existence of
the ﬁrm cannot be conceived of without business relationships, in contrast
to what most orthodox economists postulate (Robertson & Dennison, 1923,
p. 73). No existing (i.e., surviving) ﬁrm is ‘‘an island in a sea of arm’s-length
relations’’ (Hakansson & Snehota, 1989). All the business relationships that
the ﬁrm initiates, develops, sustains, and terminates with counterparts – most
notably suppliers and customers – affect somewhat corporate functioning
and development. In the event of deliberately terminating the business
relationships in which the ﬁrm is involved (or seeing those abruptly ended by
the counterparts’ will), the ﬁrm is not only somehow impeded to operate and
grow, but most importantly, is likely to perish.
As Ford et al. (1998, p. 13) put it: ‘‘A company’s relationships are important
assets and without them it could not operate, or even exist.’’ Business
relationships are one of the most valuable resources at the ﬁrm’s disposal
(Easton & Araujo, 1993; Hakansson, 1989, 1987). ‘‘A [business] relationship
is one of the resources the company can exploit and use in combination with
other resources (other relationships) available to the company’’ (Hakansson &
Snehota, 1995, p. 27). Interestingly, the most illustrious theorists of the
so-called competence-based theory of the ﬁrm – the theory whose focus is on
corporate resources and competences – include business relationships either
as one of such resources (Barney, 1991) or as a part of the ‘‘strategic assets’’
(Amit & Schoemaker, 1993) or the ‘‘asset position’’ of the ﬁrm (Teece, Pisano,
& Shuen, 1997). Business relationships are a particular kind of resource that is
not unilaterally owned, but rather jointly controlled by the two parties directly
involved in the relationship (Hakansson & Ford, 2002). As resources, business
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relationships are non-depreciable – for their utility or value does not
necessarily decrease over time, in fact the contrary seems to be the case
(Hakansson & Snehota, 1995) – and extremely difﬁcult to replicate or
substitute (Hakansson, 1989) as well as to acquire or sell across markets
(Anderson, Havila, & Salmi, 2001). A business relationship, being essentially
an implicit contract embedded in the identity of the involved parties without
which it loses meaning (Ben-Porath, 1980), can be thus seen as an intangible
and idiosyncratic (i.e., counterpart-speciﬁc) resource, not easily if at all
tradable between ﬁrms (Hakansson & Snehota, 1995).
Business relationships are therefore signiﬁcant to the ﬁrm. Needless to
say, relationship signiﬁcance also exists in relation to the counterparts with
which the ﬁrm is connected. Suppliers and customers are as dependent on
business relationships (for survival or growth) as the ﬁrm is.
Understandably, MAN theorists are inclined to admit that business
relationships contribute somewhat to corporate survival and growth and
stress the ‘‘strategic importance’’ or ‘‘signiﬁcance’’ of business relationships
(Gadde et al., 2003; Hakansson, 1989) or refer to business relationships as of
‘‘strategic status’’ (Moller & Halinen, 1999) and ‘‘critical,’’ ‘‘crucial,’’ ‘‘good,’’
‘‘high-performing,’’ ‘‘high-quality,’’ ‘‘important,’’ ‘‘relevant,’’ ‘‘signiﬁcant,’’
or ‘‘valuable’’ (Cunningham, 1980; Ford et al., 1998; Ford & McDowell,
1999; Gadde & Snehota, 2000; Hakansson, 1987; Hakansson & Snehota,
1995; Johanson & Mattsson, 1987; Kutschker, 1982; Naude & Buttle, 2000).
Even the celebrated Edith Penrose (1959, p. 147, fn. 2), whose seminal
research shed light on the limits to the growth and size of the ﬁrm presciently
remarks ‘‘[t]he importance attached by ﬁrms to the maintenance of their
existing business relationshipsy.’’
Very frequently signiﬁcant business relationships are, more or less
explicitly, likened to business relationships maintained with signiﬁcant
counterparts (Wiley, Wilkinson, & Young, 2006, p. 5) or business relation-
ships held with interesting (or value-providing) counterparts (Hakansson &
Snehota, 1995, pp. 202–203). The signiﬁcance of a certain business
relationship is not (and cannot be) explained by appealing to the signiﬁcance
of a particular ﬁrm, for instance, in terms of its internally available resources
and competences – that would necessarily deny the suitableness of the
network perspective on industrial markets and, just to mention one aspect,
the impact of connected business relationships. Only recently has the (focal)
ﬁrm’s signiﬁcance been unequivocally recognized within the MAN theory,
that is to say, the ﬁrm being as an individually signiﬁcant and interdependent
entity (Ford & Hakansson, 2006a, p. 7). The author’s focus of interest here is
relationship signiﬁcance, rather than the signiﬁcance of the ﬁrm.
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Given that relationship signiﬁcance is a primordial cornerstone of MAN
theory, it seems paradoxical that the causes of relationship signiﬁcance
are for the most part left unidentiﬁed. Within any theory some issues are
corroborated by previous research and thus reckoned as beyond challenge
while other issues, less obvious, remain greatly unexplored. The causes
of relationship signiﬁcance, the authors think, are bound to be one of the
‘‘currently hidden aspects of business networks’’ pointed out by Alajoutsi-
jarvi, Eriksson, and Tikkanen (2001). The deconstruction and analysis of
the metaphorical structure of the ‘‘network talk’’ devised and deployed at
large by the IMP undertaken by Alajoutsijarvi et al. (2001) can help one
understand why the neglect or omission of some relevant questions and
issues also happens within MAN theory. Alajoutsijarvi et al. (2001) hint
that, on account of metaphors predominantly employed in the theoretical
discourse of MAN theorists (and in diverse sub-discourses), some aspects of
business relationships and networks are inquired while others simply remain
out of investigation. Dominant metaphors guide theorists toward certain
research questions and acceptable answers.
Although MAN theory provides a ‘‘general picture of the signiﬁcance of
business relationships’’ (Ford & Hakansson, 2006b, p. 251), the authors
claim that relationship signiﬁcance is largely an understudied and taken-for-
granted issue whose potential causes are not yet subject to a systematic
and thorough analysis by MAN theorists. To the author’s best knowledge,
Wiley et al.’s (2006) and Wiley, Wilkinson, and Young’s (2003) empirical
research on the ‘‘sources’’ of relationship signiﬁcance (as perceived only by
suppliers) in Sweden, Germany, and China is a meritorious exception.
Several MAN theorists assert and reiterate relationship signiﬁcance but
seldom if ever discuss the issue in depth. Such a discussion is allegedly
unneeded because all research conducted by the IMP is ‘‘about the various
ways in which business relationships are signiﬁcant,’’ to cite an anonymous
reviewer’s comments to the authors’ arguments in an earlier version of this
paper. Or, even more emphatically, MAN theorists may argue that ‘‘the IMP
research conﬁrmed the signiﬁcance of lasting customer-supplier relation-
ships’’ (Blankenburg-Holm & Johanson, 1992, p. 6). Such foundationalist
position, for sure dispensable, is easy to explain. MAN theorists take business
relationships to be almost by deﬁnition signiﬁcant to the ﬁrm. The reasoning
is basically the following: if business relationships are de facto deliberately
initiated, nurtured, and sustained by the ﬁrm, then a fortiori business
relationships must have some usefulness (i.e., be somewhat signiﬁcant) for
that purposive entity. MAN theorists observe and report recurrently the
ﬁrm as willingly related to and heavily dependent on several counterparts,
Anatomy of Relationship Signiﬁcance 367
inferring therefore that business relationships ought to be signiﬁcant to some
extent to the ﬁrm. In a nutshell, MAN theorists have taken the pervasive
existence of business relationships as a secure warrant of relationship
signiﬁcance. The taken-for-grantedness of relationship signiﬁcance is attested
by the absence of explicit debate within MAN theory and is made clear by
Hakansson and Snehota (1995, p. 330) who contend that the foci of interest
of MAN theorists are ‘‘the important [vertical] relationships’’ to the disfavor
of ‘‘uninteresting [and unimportant]’’ ones, as if business relationships are
a priori signiﬁcant to the ﬁrm while arm’s-length or purely transactional
relations with suppliers and customers are as a rule insigniﬁcant to the ﬁrm.
One does not deny the existence of signiﬁcant business relationships but
argue, contra the consensus within MAN theory, that relationship signiﬁ-
cance should not be an axiom. For ‘‘signiﬁcance’’ cannot be a property
of each and every one of the ﬁrm’s business relationships. Relationship
signiﬁcance is real but does not exist always and at all times – that is,
business relationships need not all be necessarily signiﬁcant to some extent to
the ﬁrm. Business relationships are not inevitably ‘‘islands of signiﬁcance in a
sea of ordinariness’’ (cf. Ford & Hakansson, 2006a, p. 11), since relationship
signiﬁcance is liable to change over time and business relationships can
even become on occasion burdens or liabilities to the ﬁrm (Hakansson &
Snehota, 1998). That the ﬁrm is likely to have but a few (highly) signiﬁcant
business relationships is corroborated by the frequent observation made by
MAN theorists that a limited number of suppliers and customers account
for the majority of ﬁrms’ total purchases and sales respectively, the so-called
80/20 rule.
The authors adopt explicitly a critical realist perspective here and claim
that relationship signiﬁcance is a notorious event of the business world,
taking place intermittently (with no easily or unambiguously identiﬁed
beginning and end) and ‘‘here and there’’ – an event that co-exists with other
events (e.g., transactional interﬁrm relations) and is not always rightly
perceived as such by the ﬁrm, let alone other ﬁrms. Surely, the occurrence
of that event does not depend on the existence of any perception, correct or
not. Each business relationship is what it is – highly signiﬁcant, totally
insigniﬁcant, or somewhere in between – regardless of any perceptions or
knowledge held in that regard by the ﬁrm or any other ﬁrm. Ford and
Hakansson’s (2006a) enumeration of the core features of vertical interﬁrm
interaction include the ‘‘subjective interpretation’’ of individuals and
groups within the ﬁrm. For the sake of simplicity, one considers here the
anthropomorphic perception of the ﬁrm concerning the signiﬁcance of
business relationships – acknowledging that relationship signiﬁcance as
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perceived by the ﬁrm needs not match exactly the real relationship
signiﬁcance. Even though the ﬁrm’s perceptions per se do not make a
business relationship signiﬁcant or contrariwise, the possibility that such
perceptions may have repercussions on the degree of signiﬁcance of that
relationship (and possibly on the degree of signiﬁcance of other, connected
business relationships) in the future should not be excluded altogether. For
instance, the ﬁrm can misjudge the (averagely signiﬁcant) business relation-
ship with supplier A as completely insigniﬁcant and as a consequence,
decide not to nurture that business relationship, possibly leading to the
relationship’s fading over time, or even take deliberate steps to end it.
Although relationship signiﬁcance is unlikely to be objectively identiﬁed
by ﬁrms, it is ‘‘something’’ – an event – that can or cannot result on account
of (mostly unidentiﬁed) causes. Therefore, the main objective of this paper is
to identify in a tentative manner the causes (i.e., the structures and powers)
potentially responsible for bringing about such event of the business world.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section addresses the authors’
meta-theoretical point of departure, namely critical realism. While the third
section offers a brief outlook of the business world (and constitutive entities
and events), the fourth section tentatively advances underlying causes of
relationship signiﬁcance. The last section features the concluding remarks,
namely theoretical and managerial implications and limitations of the paper
as well as a research agenda for the future.
2. THE META-THEORETICAL POINT
OF DEPARTURE
Scholars and researchers build necessarily upon a particular set of assumptions
when investigating the world, that is, a ‘‘meta-theory’’ or ‘‘philosophy of
science’’: the way the world is (i.e., ontology), how the world can be known
(i.e., epistemology), which methods and techniques can be employed in the
world’s inquiry (i.e., methodology), and what causes the world to be as it is
(i.e., etiology). Questions formulated as well as answers tentatively offered
by scholars and researchers are likely to differ on account of different meta-
theoretical commitments.
Each and every scholar and researcher adopts often in an implicit way one
of three meta-theories: positivism, postmodernism, or (critical) realism.
Positivists see the world as a closed system wherein determinism prevails and
cause-effect relations can be empirically observed and recorded, whereas
postmodernists argue that the world ‘‘lies in the eyes of the beholder,’’ being
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fully socially constructed by humankind through discourse or interpersonal
interaction and convention. For critical realists, on the contrary, the world
as a whole is an open system that exists regardless of any knowledge one
may have of or develop about the world and – as the ‘‘critical’’ label suggests
– social scientists should be critical of the social world on which provide
tentative descriptions and explanations.
Critical realism takes the world to be composed of a myriad of entities and
events, both of which need not be conﬁned to the realm of the observable.
Entities exhibit peculiar structures, that is, sets of interrelated properties that
make them the kind of entities that are and not anything else. In virtue of
structures, entities necessarily possess (though may not exercise) emergent
powers and liabilities, hence being both capable of doing some things and
incapable of doing others. The powers and liabilities of an entity emerge mostly
from the powers and liabilities of individual structural constituents but also
from the powers and liabilities of relations that the entity maintains with other
entities. Nevertheless, the powers and liabilities of an entity are irreducible to
any of (i.e., are more than the sum of) the powers and liabilities of both consti-
tuents and relations. Not only entities have a structure and, as a consequence,
powers and liabilities. Some relations that entities establish and maintain
among themselves possess a particular structure, hence being endowed with
powers and liabilities. The powers and liabilities of any relation derive at large
from the powers and liabilities of the interrelated entities, primarily the powers
and liabilities of the two parties directly connected through the relation but
also of others directly and indirectly connected to them.
The world’s events result when the powers of entities are exercised (or, on
the contrary, liabilities are impeded) under speciﬁc contingencies, namely
particular geo-historical conditions or the presence (or absence) of other
entities and the activation (or obstruction) of powers and liabilities.
One example usually given to illustrate the critical realist view is that of
human beings. Humans, by virtue of an intricate physiological, anatomical,
and social make-up (e.g., brains, respiratory systems, arms, legs, status, and
so on), have the outstanding powers to think, talk, listen, run, jump, and
swim – powers put to work always under (restrictive or enabling) spatial
and temporal conditions (e.g., a man cannot speak ﬂuently a foreign
language without proper and lengthy instruction and repeated practice nor
can play tennis in the absence of either a court, an opponent, a racket, or a
reasonable knowledge of the game).
Ontological, epistemological, methodological, and etiological assump-
tions of the three mutually exclusive meta-theories mentioned earlier are
summarized, for instance, by Sousa (this volume).
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2.1. The Suitability of a Critical Realist Approach
The world is usually seen as divided in two: the natural and the social, that is,
nature and society. The authors stand with those that believe that the world
largely predates all human beings, for the world has existed and still exists
at large independently of human knowledge or identiﬁcation of it. While
holding the realist conviction – that the world at large is what it is regardless
of what humans choose to say, think, or write – one must also acknowledge
the social construction of some parts of the world.
The social world (and in particular, the business world on which the
authors are mostly interested) is to some degree socially constructed by
humans through discourse or interpersonal interaction and convention
(e.g., theories, rules, symbols, and so forth). Contra the arguments of those
espousing a ‘‘strong social constructivist’’ or postmodernist stance, one
needs to acknowledge that the social world is not merely a tour de force of
humankind or the feasible aftermath of human intents and actions.
The authors adopt explicitly a critical realist approach throughout this
paper – an approach which is suitable by bearing in mind not only the
foregoing meta-theoretical assumptions but also the research’s unit of analysis,
namely business relationships (as notorious entities of the business world).
3. ENTITIES AND EVENTS OF
THE BUSINESS WORLD
One should acknowledge that the world exists for the most part
independently of what anyone may think, say, or write about it, for the
world’s entities and events exist and endure regardless of any human
identiﬁcation or knowledge of them. One also recognizes that the social
world in general – and the business world in particular – is to some extent
a social construction of humankind through theories, frameworks, or
concepts. In respect of business relationships’ creation, see for instance
Blois’ (2003) arguments.
The conventional depiction of the business world is that of neoclassical
economics whereby ﬁrms are portrayed as atomistic units, hence operating
in markets (i.e., placing bids and replying to asks). Markets, naturally
faceless, are aggregates of the arm’s-length relations established instantly
and frictionlessly among numerous buyers and sellers. In such a stylized
picture, one can only ﬁnd ﬁrms and vertical pure market relations (and the
markets that these transactions overall form). However, the business world
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is not like that at all, being composed of ﬁrms that are interdependent units
(with a strongly interconnected behavior and performance), necessarily
developing and sustaining multiple kinds of relations among themselves
(Fig. 1). As Allyn Young (1928) wisely advances, the division of labor
takes place not only within ﬁrms but also among them. That is to say,
specialization and ‘‘integration’’ (typically in the form of interﬁrm
cooperation) go hand in hand, with the former both requiring and
propelling the latter (Blois, 1972; Piore, 1992). Specialization and integra-
tion are two indissociable features of the division of labor, whose beneﬁts
are ﬁrst pointed out by Adam Smith (1776 [1999]). George Richardson
(1972) extends Smith’s pioneering analysis by claiming that the division of
labor does not take place either in ﬁrms or in markets. Richardson rejects
the ‘‘distorted view’’ of standard theories of ﬁrm and of markets in which
the governance (or management) of economic activities is carried out either
through hierarchical direction (within ﬁrms) or by the price mechanism
(operating spontaneously among ﬁrms). Richardson alludes to pervasive
phenomena of the business world, arguing for the existence of a governance
structure alternative to the ‘‘visible hand’’ of ﬁrms and the ‘‘invisible hand’’
of markets: ‘‘interﬁrm cooperation.’’ The usually ‘‘close, complex and
ramiﬁed’’ (vertical) cooperation is clearly distinguishable from markets
(and the constitutive interﬁrm transactions) wherein ‘‘there is no continuing
Interfirm relations
Horizontal
(with competitors)
Vertical
(with suppliers or customers)
Competition Cooperation
(i.e., inter-organizational relationships 
or business relationships)
Exchange
(i.e., arm’s-length relations)
Fig. 1. Types and Forms of Interﬁrm Relations.
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association, no give and take, but an isolated act of purchase and saley’’
(Richardson, 1972, p. 891).
The business world is composed of multiple and complexly interrelated
entities and events, not just the ones alluded to by neoclassical economists.
Besides the prominent ﬁrms and the markets in which these operate, one
should acknowledge that (horizontal and vertical) interﬁrm cooperative
relations – so-called inter-organizational relationships and business relation-
ships, respectively – are also notorious entities of the business world. And
besides the oft-noted exchange transactions of ﬁrms (i.e., arm’s-length
relations), one is bound to ﬁnd relationship signiﬁcance as a pervasive event
of the business world. The arm’s-length relation (also referred to as ‘‘purely
transactional relation’’ or ‘‘interﬁrm transaction’’) is a basic constituent of
the market in the same way as the business relationship (or ‘‘interﬁrm
interaction’’) is a basic constituent of the network. The dichotomous view of
the vertical interﬁrm linkages (including either arm’s-length relations or
business relationships, i.e., either isolated transactions or enmeshed interac-
tions, respectively) can be deemed by some scholars and researchers as overly
simplifying. One challenging perspective is that of Macneil (1980) who
postulates a continuum ranging from ‘‘discrete’’ to ‘‘relational’’ exchanges
within which the majority of interﬁrm exchanges fall, arguing in favor of
the unlikely existence of purely discrete transactions between ﬁrms. That
Macneil’s – and Macaulay’s (1963) – relational contract theory can be of great
help in the conceptualization of the business world is attested by, for instance,
Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh (1987) and Blois (2002).
Whereas ﬁrms and business relationships (and networks) and markets are
all entities of the business world, arm’s-length relations between ﬁrms are
mere phenomena devoid of any structure and powers (i.e., transitory events
taking place).
The authors address brieﬂy in turn these entities and events, giving
particular emphasis to both ﬁrms and business relationships (and the
structure and powers that these entities commonly display) while ruling
inter-organizational relationships out of discussion. The horizontal coop-
erative relationships that ﬁrms develop mostly with direct competitors but
also with ‘‘complementors’’ (i.e., producers of complementary products)
(Nalebuff & Brandenburger, 1996) and third parties (e.g., universities,
technological centers, or trade associations), usually exhibit a distinctive set
of characteristics, are established for speciﬁc and clearly delimited purposes,
formal (i.e., ruled by written, detailed, and legally enforcing contracts),
and rather short-termed. Inter-organizational relationships can take various
forms, for example, alliances, consortia, interlocking directorates, joint
Anatomy of Relationship Signiﬁcance 373
ventures, strategic networks, and trade associations (Barringer & Harrison,
2000). Such entities of the business world are likely to have some powers
and liabilities (e.g., can foster the development of new products and allow
free-riding by a partner, respectively) on account of the aforementioned
structural features. This kind of interﬁrm cooperation – horizontal, formal,
and momentary – is much less predominant in the business world than
the vertical, informal, and lasting interﬁrm cooperation (Hakansson &
Johanson, 1988). For an overview of the literature on inter-organizational
relationships, see the Organization Science 9(3), 1998 or the Strategic
Management Journal 21(3), 2000. The authors’ decision to leave out of
discussion the structure and powers and liabilities of inter-organizational
relationships (and the potential impact of these relationships upon the
structure, powers, and liabilities of ﬁrms) is accounted for by the primary
focus here being the description and explanation of the causes potentially
responsible for bringing about relationship signiﬁcance, an event which is
not directly related to the ﬁrm’s inter-organizational relationships – as will be
seen in Section 4.
3.1. Firms
Firms are heterogeneous entities exhibiting complex structures and therefore
powers and liabilities. Firms include a myriad of resources and competences,
for the most part internally owned and controlled, but also externally
accessed and explored (Penrose, 1959). Several degrees of authority and
empowerment, hierarchical levels, communication channels, rites, explicit
rules, tacit conventions, and so forth can also be found within ﬁrms.
Owing to such complexly interrelated constituents (especially resources
and competences, both internal and external), ﬁrms are entities potentially
endowed with certain powers and liabilities, for instance, being able to
perform activities and generate goods, services, cash-ﬂows, or proﬁts.
Firms are surely interconnected entities, establishing, developing,
sustaining, and terminating several types and forms of relations with one
another. Interestingly, almost all the interﬁrm relations are themselves
entities, mostly immaterial ones – the exception being arm’s-length relations
that are events (see Section 3.2). Interﬁrm relations, interrelated to some
degree and not necessarily in a reinforcing manner, can be classiﬁed for one
as horizontal or vertical. Horizontal interﬁrm relations display competition
and cooperation facets, whereas vertical interﬁrm relations feature exchange
and cooperation. In general competition is the basic feature of horizontal
interﬁrm relations and cooperation prevails in vertical ones. But that needs
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not be the case, and horizontal cooperation and vertical exchange are also
found in the business world (Fig. 1).
These fourfold interﬁrm relations are now described brieﬂy. First, ﬁrms
often compete with one another for business with (common) suppliers and
customers, primarily for acquisition of inputs or sale of outputs. Competition
is likely to be a more or less notorious relation between ﬁrms aiming to effect
exchange or engage in cooperation with counterparts, presently or in the
future. Arguably, competitive relations impact – differently and to diverse
extents – upon the exchange and cooperative interﬁrm relations. One offers
two illustrative examples: given the limitedness of the ﬁrm’s resources
and competences, to undertake transaction A (with a certain supplier) often
means not to undertake transaction B (with another supplier), presuming the
acquisition of substitute products, and to effect cooperation with counterpart
C may impede (or at least constrain) the cooperation with counterpart D.
Some arm’s-length relations as well as some business relationships rival with
one another to some extent, vying for the limited resources and competences
of ﬁrms – and these two forms of vertical interﬁrm linkages are themselves
‘‘rivals,’’ for example, the ﬁrm’s transaction with counterpart E may preclude
cooperation with that same or with another counterpart (or vice-versa).
Although one considers competitive interﬁrm relations to be entities of the
business world (showing characteristics, some of them that are commonly
found in vertical cooperative relations, e.g., high degrees of informality and
continuity), the structure and powers and liabilities of those entities are not
addressed in detail here – for the same reasons that inter-organizational
relationships are neglected.
Second, although competitors ‘‘rival’’ most of the time, horizontal
(formalized and short-lived) cooperation is likely to emerge, for instance,
aiming at new product co-development. Third, ﬁrms engage in purely
transactional relations with suppliers and customers, buying inputs and selling
outputs only at arm’s-length distance. And ﬁnally, ﬁrms are often committed
to lasting, informal, complex, and symmetrical relationships with (important)
suppliers and customers. In sum, interﬁrm relations boil down to competition,
cooperation (horizontal or vertical, i.e., inter-organizational relationships or
business relationships), and exchange (i.e., arm’s-length relations).
Given the interrelatedness of ﬁrms (mostly vertical but also horizontal),
corporate structures and consequential powers and liabilities are themselves
connected to each other. That is to say, the structure, powers, and liabilities
of each and every ﬁrm affect and are affected by, to varying extents and in
different ways, the structure, powers, and liabilities of counterparts to which
ﬁrms are directly or indirectly connected (mostly suppliers and customers
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but also competitors) – what Ford et al. (1998) refer to as the ‘‘co-evolution’’
feature of business networks. Most importantly, and seemingly a pivotal
argument of this paper, the structure, powers, and liabilities of ﬁrms are
likely to be somewhat affected (i.e., enhanced or impaired) by the structure,
powers, and liabilities of the linkages that ﬁrms establish, develop, and
sustain among themselves over time – that impact being possibly stronger in
the case of business relationships. Surely, the reverse is valid: the structure,
powers, and liabilities of ﬁrms are bound to affect differently and to
different degrees the structure, powers, and liabilities of interﬁrm relations,
most notably business relationships (Ford, Gadde, Hakansson, Snehota, &
Waluszewski, 2008).
3.2. Markets and Arm’s-Length Relations
All ﬁrms are vertically linked, upstream with suppliers and downstream
with customers. Firms’ vertical linkages can however differ sharply, ranging
from almost instant exchanges undertaken in markets (i.e., arm’s-length or
purely transactional relations) to the lasting and complex relationships in
networks (i.e., business relationships). Firms have in general the option to
engage in either (instantaneous) transactions or (recurring) interactions
with each of suppliers and customers. That is, ﬁrms either choose to effect
discrete, on-off transactions governed by the price mechanism wherein
price and quantity prevail at large or instead establish and develop a pattern
of interactions with suppliers or customers wherein parties exchange
both economic and social elements, and mutual trust and commitment,
reciprocity, and future interaction all matter. A ﬁrm’s decision to transact
with a certain counterpart implies necessarily the decision of not to
interact with that same entity. Although exchange and cooperation are
mutually exclusive linkages (at least with regard to a speciﬁc counterpart),
arm’s-length relations often precede business relationships – for only after
repeated (purely economic) purchases and sales can ﬁrms begin to get to
know each other and decide to develop a cooperative relationship that goes
far beyond mere interﬁrm exchanges. Yet not always do ﬁrms have the
option to develop business relationships, for instance because of counter-
parts’ lack of interest or decreased commitment in the development of such
relationships (Biong, Wathne, & Parvatiyar, 1997).
These two forms of vertical linkages feature dissimilar contents, thus
serving utterly different purposes. Although arm’s-length relations enable
the acquisition or sale in markets of standardized resources, business
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relationships allow ﬁrms to access and explore (complementary) resources
and competences of counterparts (e.g., a customer’s reputation or a
supplier’s know-how in a ﬁeld of expertise, respectively).
In essence, arm’s-length relations are but ﬂeeting (and naturally structure-
less and powerless) events that come about whenever at least two ﬁrms
demonstrate the will to and agree in bringing to completion an exchange – a
transaction that is (almost) instantly initiated and terminated. Although one
can (more or less) easily point out the beginning and end of an arm’s-length
relation, that task can hardly or unequivocally be done in the case of a
business relationship. This view of interﬁrm transactional relations as
potential events is not completely strange to economists, being endorsed
for instance by Alfred Marshall (1890 [1997], p. 182): ‘‘An exchange is an
eventyit is something that happens. A market is a setting within which
exchange may take placey.’’ Yet, those same economists are prone to
neglect grossly the existence of prominent entities of the business world,
in particular business relationships and the overall networks in which ﬁrms
are deeply embedded. As the authors argue for in the following section, such
(intricate and evolving) vertical cooperative relationships are entities, surely
not transitory events. More awkwardly, economists fail to acknowledge that
markets (i.e., aggregates of interﬁrm transactions) are themselves entities –
the exception being those that argue that markets are ‘‘institutions’’
constructed, reproduced, and transformed by ﬁrms (Loasby, 2000).
Markets comprise inter alia all the intermittent events constituting (and
taking place in) them, that is, the set of transactional relations instantly
linking ﬁrms. Markets include necessarily a large number of other elements
that are to some extent indispensable for framing and governing the
undertaking of interﬁrm transactions such as physical spaces (marketplaces),
legal or contractual rules, cultural conventions, and technologies.
3.3. Networks and Business Relationships
Business relationships go beyond purely economic transactions between
ﬁrms. Such ‘‘substantial’’ vertical relationships entail multiple personal
interaction episodes – face-to-face or through telephone, fax, or email – that
involve the exchange of both economic and non-economic elements (e.g.,
money and products, and trust, commitment, and knowledge, respectively).
Business relationships are ‘‘patterns of (previous and current) interaction and
interdependence between two ﬁrms, vertically connected and reciprocally
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committed to each other’’ (Ford, Hakansson, & Johanson, 1986, p. 390;
Hakansson & Snehota, 1995, p. 25, 2000, p. 38).
Business relationships are not only direct relationships that the ﬁrm
initiates, develops, and maintains upstream with suppliers and downstream
with customers, including all the other vertical yet indirect relationships
(e.g., those between the ﬁrm and suppliers’ suppliers or customers’
customers). ‘‘An indirect relationship is most simply described as the
relationship between two ﬁrms which are not directly related but which is
mediated by a third ﬁrm with which they both have [direct] relationships’’
(Easton, 1992, p. 15). Understandably, indirect business relationships far
outnumber direct ones. In contrast to the discreteness of arm’s-length
relations, business relationships are necessarily interconnected in many
ways, not only directly or indirectly (as mentioned), but also positively or
negatively – that is to say, interﬁrm interaction in one business relationship
depends respectively on the existence or absence of interaction in another
business relationship. The ‘‘generalised connectedness’’ of business relation-
ships brings about co-produced, self-organizing, and adaptive macro-
structures, the so-called (business) networks whose evolution is beyond any
ﬁrm’s control or intent and in which all ﬁrms seek to manage (Easton,
Wilkinson, & Georgieva, 1997; Wilkinson, 2006). Networks are formed and
modiﬁed through multiplex interaction, thus being partly opaque (even to
participant ﬁrms), ‘‘centerless’’, and unbounded (Johanson & Hallen, 1989).
The development of any business relationship is a time-consuming, path-
dependent, and costly process (Johanson & Mattsson, 1985). Business
relationships are developed over time as: reciprocal investments are made in
the relationship; the ‘‘distance’’ that normally exists at an early phase of
interaction (e.g., of a social, cultural, technological, temporal, or geographi-
cal basis) and the reluctance of ﬁrms to cooperate (partially related to the
uncertainty regarding counterparts’ actual intentions or future behavior) are
greatly reduced; and interdependence, mutual trust, and commitment, and
expectations of future interaction all gradually increase among the parties
(Ford et al., 1986). One may be thus prone to consider that business
relationships always develop toward an ideal state – ‘‘a successful marriage’’
– where interﬁrm conﬂict is totally absent, as the likes of Ford (1980) and
Dwyer et al. (1987) do in traditional life cycle models of relationship
development. Yet one is unable to ﬁnd a totally cooperative business
relationship, and some business relationships may even fail to develop or are
eventually terminated, owing largely to persistent barriers to interaction (e.g.,
mismatches between ﬁrms in terms of organizational culture or strategy,
conﬂicting expectations, or behavior of individuals) (Cunningham, 1982).
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Business relationships evolve gradually over time (though not toward any
pre-determined end), as ﬁrms learn to ‘‘dance’’ with one another, both
leading and following (Wilkinson & Young, 1994).
Both history and structure matter in business relationships. Current
interﬁrm interaction is strongly rooted in the past and shapes future
interaction. Firms interact with an eye on the future of the business
relationship but always remembering previous interaction episodes. As
Axelrod (1981) notes, cooperation can emerge and thrive in a world of
individual egoists and without the assistance of a central authority.
Friendship, mutual interests and objectives, or trust may all be necessary
but are not sufﬁcient conditions for the development of cooperation.
Although may at ﬁrst seem counterintuitive, reciprocity – which can come
close to the avoidance of retaliation or ‘‘tit for tat’’ – is the indispensable
base for cooperation. Although Axelrod is focused on cooperation among
self-centered individuals in society, he believes that his theory is equally
applicable to the business world (Axelrod, 1981, pp. 178–179). In this
regard, the incentive of ﬁrms to cooperate at a given point in time
(e.g., through business relationships) comes largely from the existence of a
history of previous, mutually rewarding interactions and a large ‘‘shadow of
the future’’ (i.e., the parties’ anticipation of mutually rewarding interactions
in the future) (Axelrod, 1984; Johanson & Smith, 1992). Finally, the
surrounding structure of interactions – that is, connected business relation-
ships and even the overall business network – impact upon the extant
interaction among ﬁrms, either reinforcing or hindering that interaction.
3.3.1. Structure, Powers, and Liabilities of Business Relationships
Business relationships, on account of the aforementioned development process,
are likely to exhibit a peculiar and changeable nature or structure. For sure,
business relationships do not change on their own. Only ﬁrms are capable of
effecting changes in the structure of business relationships, for example, by
increasing mutual adaptations, reducing the extent of interpersonal contacts,
and so forth.
Hakansson and Snehota (1995) list the (more or less easily perceptible)
eight features of business relationships: continuity, complexity, symmetry,
informality, adaptations, ‘‘coopetition,’’ social interaction, and routinization.
That is to say, business relationships are long-lasting, entail a multiplex
interpersonal contact pattern between ﬁrms and can be deployed to
pursue different corporate objectives, are symmetrical in terms of parties’
interest to develop and sustain them, are ruled by implicit and incomplete
contracts, involve a large amount of relationship-speciﬁc investments
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(so-called ‘‘adaptations’’), display both cooperative and competitive facets,
involve a myriad of extensive and interlinked social bonds between
individuals and groups of both parties, and give rise to norms of mutual
conduct and institutionalized rights and duties.
Owing at large to such an intricate structure (and to a smaller extent to
relationship connectedness), business relationships are likely to exhibit a
sixfold set of emergent powers and liabilities and are thus capable to
produce positive and negative effects for ﬁrms. In general, MAN theorists
refer to the powers and liabilities of business relationships and the effects
resulting from exercising those powers and liabilities as ‘‘functions’’ and
‘‘dysfunctions’’ (or ‘‘non-functions’’), and ‘‘beneﬁts’’ and ‘‘sacriﬁces,’’
respectively (Hakansson & Johanson, 1993a; Walter, Muller, Helfert, &
Ritter, 2003; Walter & Ritter, 2003; Walter, Ritter, & Gemunden, 2001).
The authors stick here to the realist terminology of powers and liabilities,
though taking advantage of the ‘‘beneﬁts-sacriﬁces’’ dichotomy to address
relationship effects.
Like any other structured and powerful entity of the business world,
business relationships are ‘‘causally efﬁcacious’’ entities. Business relation-
ships have the potential to be causal, that is, can bring about to diverse
degrees change anywhere in the business world including within other entities
(e.g., enhance the structure of ﬁrms directly linked, impair the powers of
third parties directly and indirectly linked to the cooperating parties, or
even hinder the exercise of liabilities in connected business relationships)
and in transitory events (e.g., impede cooperating parties to establish new
arm’s-length relations with other entities or contribute to the decrease in the
degree of signiﬁcance of a connected business relationship).
Business relationships are established, developed, and maintained
mostly because of the rewarding powers that perform (or are expected
to perform in the future) and, as a result, the actual beneﬁts that result
(or the potential beneﬁts that are likely to result) mostly for ﬁrms directly
involved in those cooperative relationships but also for indirectly connected
counterparts (Kalwani & Narayandas, 1995). Beneﬁts, however, can
only be obtained by ﬁrms at the expense of some (actual or potential)
sacriﬁces that are in part related to the liabilities of business relationships –
this is not to say that the possibility of temporary free-riding by
opportunistic ﬁrms, beneﬁting without incurring any sacriﬁce whatsoever,
is not real. Potential (yet inactive) powers and liabilities of business
relationships (and the respective beneﬁts and sacriﬁces resulting thereof) can
be as crucial as actual ones in ﬁrms’ decisions to nurture and sustain
business relationships.
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Business relationships are bound to display six main powers, namely
‘‘access,’’ ‘‘control,’’ ‘‘efﬁciency,’’ ‘‘innovation,’’ ‘‘stability,’’ and ‘‘network-
ing.’’ That is to say, business relationships can have the power to provide
ﬁrms with, respectively, access to and exploration of (and sometimes even
development of) counterparts’ complementary resources and competences
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978); increase of inﬂuence over (or reduction of
dependence on) counterparts or promotion (or block) of relationship or
network change (Lundgren, 1992; Mattsson & Johanson, 1992); reduction of
production or transaction costs (Mouzas, 2006); identiﬁcation of previously
unknown characteristics of resources and competences or discovery of new
ways of employing or new uses for those same resources and competences,
or the stand-alone or co-development of new ones (Hakansson, 1989;
Hakansson & Waluszewski, 2007); learning and reduction of environmental
uncertainty (Hakansson, Havila, & Pedersen, 1999; Hakansson & Johanson,
2001); and management of interdependences at resource and activity levels
(Hakansson & Ford, 2002).
Business relationships are likely to display likewise six liabilities: those of
failure in each (though not necessarily all) of the aforementioned relationship
powers. Liabilities follow whenever some powers are left unexercised –
powers expected or desired by ﬁrms to be put to work at a given point in
time, in a certain business relationship or in other, connected relationships.
For instance, the ﬁrm’s business relationship with customer A may not
activate the access power (as wanted by the ﬁrm) or merely hinders the
exercise of the control power in the ﬁrm’s relationship with supplier C.
3.3.2. Relationship Beneﬁts and Sacriﬁces
Relationship beneﬁts and sacriﬁces are two sides of the same coin. Beneﬁts
are not obtained automatically, easily or costless, being partly dependent
on sacriﬁces. Sacriﬁces (at the very least costs) need to be incurred before
beneﬁts can be harvested by ﬁrms (Araujo, Dubois, & Gadde, 1999; Gadde &
Snehota, 2000).
Relationship beneﬁts include all the positive effects ensuing to ﬁrms from
the activation of any of the referred powers, for instance, access to and
exploration of external resources and competences (Anderson, Hakansson,
& Johanson, 1994). Relationship sacriﬁces, on the contrary, encompass both
costs incurred by ﬁrms (indispensable to obtain beneﬁts) and deleterious
effects that may result to ﬁrms from being involved in business relationships.
Three relationship costs are usually borne by all ﬁrms (Blois, 1999):
opportunity costs (e.g., the ﬁrm’s relationship with customer A precludes
the obtainment of beneﬁts in the business relationship with customer B or
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hinders the appropriation of greater beneﬁts or lower sacriﬁces in the
business relationship with supplier C); ‘‘relationship handling costs’’
(i.e., costs of establishing, developing, maintaining, and terminating each
of the ﬁrm’s business relationships); and ‘‘network handling costs’’ (i.e.,
overhead costs incurred with all or most of the ﬁrm’s business relationships).
Relationship deleterious effects include (Araujo & Harrison, 2002): lock-in
effects (e.g., the ﬁrm’s business relationship with supplier D impedes the
development of a business relationship with supplier E); opportunistic
behavior of counterparts (e.g., ‘‘free-riding’’ or ‘‘hold-up’’ problems) (Biong
et al., 1997); and several other harmful consequences (e.g., damaging effects
on reputation and attractiveness as a potential partner resulting from the
ﬁrm’s business relationship with supplier F) (Mattsson, 1989).
3.3.3. Potentiality and Connectedness of Relationship Powers, Liabilities,
Beneﬁts, and Sacriﬁces
Not all business relationships necessarily exhibit all the aforementioned
sixfold set of powers and liabilities. Each business relationship may be
endowed with and put into practice different powers and liabilities over time,
whereas similar powers and liabilities (bringing about similar beneﬁts
and sacriﬁces) can be exercised in different business relationships. Some
powers and liabilities of a certain business relationship may be at work
simultaneously at a given point in time, whereas others may remain dormant.
Inasmuch as business relationships are connected to one another in
multiple ways (directly or indirectly, positively or negatively), relationship
structures and powers and liabilities, as well as relationship beneﬁts and
sacriﬁces, are likely to be complexly interrelated to varying extents. For
instance, the exercise of access power (and the resulting effect) in the ﬁrm’s
business relationship with supplier A may – directly and positively – affect
and be affected by the exercise of both access and innovation powers (and the
resulting effects) in the ﬁrm’s business relationships with supplier B and
customer C, respectively; and the incapacity or failure to put to work the
control power (and the non-resulting effect) in the ﬁrm’s business relation-
ship with customer D may – only indirectly – be conducive to the incapacity
or failure to put to work the stability power (and the non-resulting effect)
in the ﬁrm’s business relationship with supplier E. The connectedness of
business relationships has two important implications with regard to
relationship powers and liabilities and consequently the ensuing beneﬁts
and sacriﬁces: the obtainment of beneﬁts and sacriﬁces in a business
relationship can be dependent not only on the exercise of the respective
powers and liabilities in that relationship but most importantly may require
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the exercise of powers and liabilities in other, connected business relation-
ships, and the exercise of powers and liabilities (and thus the obtainment
of beneﬁts and sacriﬁces) in a business relationship can obstruct or impair
the exercise of powers and liabilities in connected business relationships and
therefore impede or impair the obtainment of (other) beneﬁts and sacriﬁces.
The ﬁrm can safeguard itself against likely changes in surrounding
contingencies – what can be referred to as ‘‘showery weather’’ – by drafting
umbrella agreements that ‘‘transform implicit norms which are embedded in
customs and commercial practices into explicit, basic norms for interac-
tion’’, thus ‘‘providing ﬂexible guidance for future contractual decisionsy’’
(Mouzas & Ford, 2006, pp. 1249–1250). Such written agreements feature
‘‘re-negotiation [clauses dealing with sensitive issues, e.g., those of
exclusivity, conﬁdentiality, or warranty] and the inclusion of extreme
contextual contingencies in the form of force majeurey’’ and ‘‘regulate
continuing interaction between actors and translate the consequences of
fulﬁlling or breaching exchange promises’’ (Mouzas & Ford, 2006, p. 1250).
In sum, business relationships are heterogeneous entities of the business
world facing a set of diverse contingencies. Relationship powers and liabilities
are inevitably put into practice under (and relationship structure may be
altered by) a myriad of different and varying surrounding conditions,
primarily connected business relationships but also arm’s-length relations
and inter-organizational relationships in which each or both of the parties
may be involved. As a consequence, relationship powers and liabilities do not
necessarily generate the events that are in general brought about whenever
put to work. When a certain power of a business relationship is exercised
at some point in time, ‘‘usual’’ effects are not necessarily brought to be (i.e.,
the ‘‘tendency’’ remains unfulﬁlled) on account of other – more or equally
powerful – counteracting powers at work in connected business relationships.
A power ‘‘does not always bring about certain effects, but it always tends
to. Hence, it acts transfactually.’’ (Fleetwood, 2001, p. 212, emphasis in
original). Entities’ powers may act transfactually owing to several and
changeable contingencies (e.g., geo-historical conditions). When a certain
power is exercised, ‘‘normal’’ outcomes (i.e., the effects that generally ensue
whenever that power is put to work) may be impeded to result because
of certain prevailing contingencies, namely the exercise of countervailing
powers (e.g., an aircraft with the power to ﬂy can fail to do so in the presence
of severe atmospherical conditions). Nevertheless, a power acts ‘‘factually’’
whenever usual effects are not deﬂected or countervailed by the exercise
of other powers (or the effects brought about). Effects resulting from the
exercise of a power cannot be known a priori, although scholars and
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researchers are usually able to identify a power’s tendency, that is, which
effects that power tends to generate. The realist conception of tendency is
different from that of positivists that often employ the term to connote the
statistical character of (nearly law-like) event regularities styled, for example,
as ‘‘whenever event X, event Y tends to follow.’’
That relationship beneﬁts and sacriﬁces are often interconnected, mediate
(i.e., obtained in the future, sometimes long after relationship powers
and liabilities are put to work), and partly intangible, helps explain why
relationship effects can neither be unequivocally identiﬁed by ﬁrms ex ante
nor are easily prone to quantiﬁcation ex post.
3.3.4. Relationship Signiﬁcance
In opposition to a common stance within MAN theory, relationship
signiﬁcance should not be taken as a given. The authors challenge here the
presumption of the ubiquitous signiﬁcance of business relationships and claim
instead that relationship signiﬁcance is but one of the business world’s events
and, as such is eventually brought about whenever certain causes are at work.
Those causes are the focus of the next section.
4. HOW IS RELATIONSHIP SIGNIFICANCE
BROUGHT ABOUT?
4.1. Relationship Beneﬁts and Sacriﬁces Appropriated by the
Firm as a Potential Cause of Relationship Signiﬁcance
Relationship signiﬁcance is commonly taken to be self-evident, or at the
very least, its causes are not made explicit within MAN theory. One
recognizes nevertheless that in case of any formal attempts to be made by
MAN theorists to justify relationship signiﬁcance, such attempts are likely
to allude to beneﬁts and sacriﬁces resulting from the exercise of relationship
powers and liabilities. MAN theorists are prone to claim tacitly that
relationship signiﬁcance is brought about by either or both of two causes:
relationship beneﬁts outweigh (related) sacriﬁces in a particular business
relationship, that is, ‘‘relationship value’’ is co-created and partly appro-
priated by the ﬁrm; and relationship beneﬁts are greater than and/or
relationship sacriﬁces less than beneﬁts and sacriﬁces (a) expected by the
ﬁrm (when experience with similar business relationships in the past is taken
into account) or (b) potentially stemming from alternatives to the business
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relationship in question, that is, substitute business relationships or
conventional governance structures (such as hierarchies and markets).
Relationship beneﬁts are usually weighted against sacriﬁces (mostly costs)
needed to attain the former. And very often, relationship beneﬁts exceed
sacriﬁces and as a result relationship value results for the ﬁrm. Relationship
value is the positive, for the most part perceived trade-off between all the
beneﬁts and sacriﬁces ensuing from the involvement in a business relation-
ship, whatever those relationship effects may be (Anderson, 1995; Wilson &
Jantrania, 1994). The subjectivity of relationship value is related to the
incommensurability of both relationship beneﬁts and sacriﬁces. How is
relationship value co-produced and afterwards distributed as well as how can
be assessed or measured by cooperating parties, remain objects of dissension
within MAN Theory and no deliberate attempt is made here to shed light on
the matter. On relationship value, see for instance the Industrial Marketing
Management, 30(4), 2001.
In addition to (or sometimes, instead of) relationship beneﬁts and
sacriﬁces being estimated or compared to each other, the ﬁrm can contrast
those relationship outcomes with (a) expected effects, by bearing in mind the
beneﬁts and sacriﬁces brought about in similar business relationships in the
past and/or potentially generated in next-best substitute relationships –
beneﬁts and sacriﬁces which are referred to as ‘‘comparison level’’ and
‘‘comparison level for alternatives,’’ that is, CL and CLalt respectively, or
(b) beneﬁts and sacriﬁces likely to emerge in alternative governance
structures, that is, if the ﬁrm decides to vertically integrate a counterpart
or instead engage in an arm’s-length relation with that counterpart,
respectively (Anderson et al., 1994; Zajac & Olsen, 1993).
Although beneﬁts and sacriﬁces potentially obtainable in hierarchies
and in markets are exhaustively detailed elsewhere, for example, in the
property rights approach (Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1990)
and transaction cost economics, respectively (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985,
1981), the authors address here brieﬂy in turn these beneﬁts and sacriﬁces.
The ‘‘costs of using the price mechanism’’ (i.e., ‘‘the costs of discovering
what the relevant prices are’’ and ‘‘the costs of negotiating, making, and
concluding a separate contract for the supply of each article or service’’) are
presciently discovered by Coase (1937, pp. 390–391). So-called marketing
costs are claimed by Coase to be the crucial factor explaining the existence
of the ﬁrm, being later referred to ‘‘costs of transacting’’ (Demsetz, 1968)
and ‘‘transaction costs’’ (Williamson, 1981). With regard to beneﬁts
associated with the ﬁrm’s engagement in purely transactional relations with
counterparts, one is likely to point out the reduction of transaction costs
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(at least when ‘‘asset speciﬁcity’’ and ‘‘uncertainty’’ are both low and
‘‘transaction frequency’’ is high) (Williamson, 1981).
Beneﬁts of employing hierarchies often include (Grossman & Hart, 1986)
the provision of incentives’ alignment, hence mitigating hold-up problems (and
other potential opportunistic behaviors); the reduction of transaction costs
(in face of highly speciﬁc assets); or the minimization of ex post losses related
to ex ante investment distortions (on account of contracts’ incompleteness).
Sacriﬁces of vertically integrating counterparts are the following: dis-
economies of scope (e.g., ‘‘diminishing returns to management’’), increasingly
internal governance costs (e.g., deriving from individuals’ pursuit of own
self-interest), or incentives’ impairment (mostly for the acquired party) and
consequently the need for monitoring costs on behalf of the acquiring ﬁrm
(Grossman & Hart, 1986). To the authors’ best knowledge, beneﬁts and
sacriﬁces of hierarchical and market governance structures are only explicitly
contrasted by Phelan and Lewin (2000).
One agrees with the implicit claim of MAN theorists that relationship
beneﬁts and sacriﬁces per se or comparatively (i.e., relationship beneﬁts
versus sacriﬁces or relationship beneﬁts and sacriﬁces versus relationship
beneﬁts and sacriﬁces expected or resulting from alternatives to the business
relationship in question, respectively) are a potential cause bringing about
relationship signiﬁcance.
Yet other causes can account for relationship signiﬁcance. In the authors’
viewpoint, at least one other cause (that underlies somewhat the aforemen-
tioned ‘‘functional’’ cause – as this cause is related to relationship functions)
can produce relationship signiﬁcance: the strong impact that business
relationships may have on the structure, powers, and liabilities of the ﬁrm
or, in other words, on corporate nature and scope (i.e., ﬁrm’s resources and
competences, and activities, respectively). One can ﬁnd management scholars
and researchers referring to the structure and powers and liabilities of ﬁrms as
corporate nature and scope respectively – for the distinguishing constituents
of ﬁrms are resources and competences (explaining largely corporate
heterogeneity) and on account of those constituents, corporate activities can
be performed.
The failure to acknowledge this ‘‘competence-based’’ cause – as the
cause pertains to corporate nature and scope – may be justiﬁed by the
spatial boundaries of MAN theory, that is, theorists’ main units of analysis
being the ‘‘interaction,’’ ‘‘relationship,’’ or ‘‘network’’ (Easton & Hakansson,
1996). All theories, conceptual frameworks or models are necessarily
bounded in space and in time given the existence of certain spatial and
temporal conditions under which are argued to hold (Bacharach, 1989).
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4.2. Impact of Business Relationships on Corporate Nature
and Scope as Another Potential Cause of Relationship Signiﬁcance
Relationship powers and liabilities are in principle sixfold each. Although the
authors do not wish to advance a hierarchy of those powers and liabilities,
two of them (namely access and innovation ones) are more consequential
than all others, by affecting the nature and scope of the ﬁrm. Access and
innovation powers (and liabilities) supply the ﬁrm with (or impede it to
obtain) respectively: access to and exploration (and on occasion development)
of external, often complementary resources and competences; and identiﬁca-
tion of formerly unrecognized features of resources and competences,
discovery of new ways of deploying or novel uses for those resources and
competences, or stand-alone or co-development of new resources and
competences. Exercising these two relationship powers, and most importantly
resulting effects, shape to a considerable extent the resources, competences,
and activities of the ﬁrm (both internal and external, actual and potential),
that is to say, the ‘‘inputs’’ to and the ‘‘things’’ that the ﬁrm does by itself and
the ‘‘things’’ that gets done by others at present and in the future.
4.2.1. The Firm Does Only Some Things by Itself
The ﬁrm is a complexly structured, powerful, and interrelated entity of the
business world. In a similar but mundane vein, one can depict a` la Loasby
(1998) the ﬁrm as a specialized system of resources and competences
operating in faceless markets and deeply embedded in intricate networks –
markets and networks wherein external resources and competences are
available for acquisition or sale and for access and exploration, respectively.
The ﬁrm has but a limited set of internal resources and competences,
thus ‘‘knowing how to do only a limited number of things’’ (Patel &
Pavitt, 1997). The ﬁrm is necessarily devoted to a certain set of activities
(i.e., scope), undertaking only those activities for which has required
resources and competences. That is, the ﬁrm is bound to be specialized in
certain activities for which corporate resources and competences – internally
developed, acquired, and/or accessed and explored – offer some sort of
‘‘comparative advantage’’ (Richardson, 1972, p. 891).
The ﬁrm’s common decision to specialize (i.e., be increasingly competent
only at some activities within a given ﬁeld of expertise), and therefore
appropriation of specialization gains (e.g., in the form of experience
curve effects), implies that the ﬁrm deliberately relies on the specialisms of
others (Young, 1928). Since in general the ﬁrm knows how to do only a few
things, the ﬁrm needs to ‘‘know how to get (other) things done by others’’
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(Nelson & Winter, 1982) – notably by counterparts to which the ﬁrm is
(or will be) vertically connected, that is, current (and prospective) suppliers
and/or customers. The ﬁrm’s specialization (in scope) thus requires and
propels ‘‘integration’’ with counterparts, for the most part through
cooperation but on occasion through exchange.
4.2.2. The Firm Gets Some Things Done by Others, Through Cooperation or
Exchange
The ﬁrm’s proneness to cooperation (mostly vertical), that is, to establish,
develop, and sustain business relationships with suppliers and customers, is
explained at large by the fact that the ﬁrm owns and controls a limited set of
resources and competences within (vertical) boundaries.
The ﬁrm has also the possibility of getting some things done by others
through exchange, that is, by engaging in arm’s-length relations with
counterparts. Although the ﬁrm can get things done in either or both of ways,
business relationships and arm’s-length relations fulﬁll different roles. Access
to and exploration (and potential development) of external resources and
competences – to be effected in networks – are accomplished only through
interﬁrm cooperation. Exchange – taking place in markets – offers a very
different route, namely internalization of external (and disposal of internal)
resources and competences typically embodied in ﬁnal products. Core
competences of others – the closely complementary competences that the ﬁrm
is commonly in need of – can be accessed and explored only through business
relationships. In alternative, arm’s-length relations provides the ﬁrm merely
with the possibility to internalize external resources from (or dispose of
internal resources to) counterparts or buy ﬁnal products (which embody to
some degree external competences) of or sell productive outputs (embodying
somewhat the ﬁrm’s internal competences) to others. For counterparts’
products (e.g., high-quality printers or premium software applications) may
be all that the ﬁrm wants or needs.
That the ﬁrm engages in arm’s-length relations with suppliers and
customers is generally because the ﬁrm is unable (or chooses not) to access
and explore external resources and competences through (costlier but
potentially more beneﬁcial) business relationships. Business relationships
presently developed and sustained with suppliers and customers are often
preceded by the ﬁrm’s engagement in arm’s-length relations with those same
counterparts in the past. In short, the ﬁrm gets different kinds of things done
through cooperation and exchange with counterparts – and it is likely that
the ﬁrm needs both of these kinds of things to diverse extents, over time.
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The ﬁrm gets things done by others at present and in the future because
of (current and upcoming) participation in business relationships and, to a
probably smaller extent, engagement in arm’s-length relations. The things
that the ﬁrm gets done, in particular external resources and competences
subject to access and exploration, are inextricably tied to business
relationships that the ﬁrm is able (and chooses) to initiate, develop,
and sustain with counterparts. More interestingly, the things that the ﬁrm
does – largely owing to a combined deployment of internal resources and
competences – are in part affected by the business relationships (and to a
smaller extent, by the arm’s-length relations) that the ﬁrm is unable (or even
if capable, decides not) to establish and develop with counterparts. The ﬁrm
may do some things by itself that cannot or does not want to get done by
others. The authors ﬁnd advisable to distinguish between business relation-
ships that the ﬁrm is able and chooses to develop and sustain and those
relationships that the ﬁrm (even if able to effect) decides not to. Not always
does the ﬁrm have possibility to participate in vertical cooperation for one
or various reasons, for example, because the ﬁrm neither is endowed with
sufﬁcient resources to devote to the development of a business relationship
nor possesses necessary relational or network competences to effect
relationship management or the ﬁrm is simply unaware of the existence of
a competent, willingly cooperative counterpart. Even when the ﬁrm has
the possibility of developing the business relationship with a supplier or
customer, the ﬁrm may prefer instead to engage in an arm’s-length relation
with that counterpart (e.g., by virtue of facing signiﬁcant opportunity
costs in that business relationship or perhaps because participation in that
business relationship would be perceived by one of present suppliers or
customers as a threat to established, lasting cooperation).
The ﬁrm may do some things by itself that cannot or does not want to get
done by others. So, and what seems to be a neglected issue within MAN
theory, the things that the ﬁrm does and the things that the ﬁrm gets done
are likely to be interrelated to some extent, over time. For the ﬁrm does
things – that is capable of doing (i.e., performs activities for which has
the necessary resources and competences) and – that on occasion is unable
to get done elsewhere (and unable to persuade others to do, timely or
competently).
Sometimes the ﬁrm needs resources and competences that do not have
in-house nor can acquire in the market or access and exploit through
business relationships. In the absence of needed external resources and
competences, the ﬁrm may either choose to develop internally those
resources and competences or instead convince others – judged by the ﬁrm
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to be potentially more resourceful and competent – to effect such
development. The latter solution is likely to be preferred whenever low
‘‘dynamic transaction costs’’ are incurred by the ﬁrm – these costs are ‘‘the
costs of not having the [resources and] capabilities you need when you need
themy,’’ that is, ‘‘the costs of persuading, negotiating, coordinating with,
and teaching outside suppliers [to develop needed yet inexistent external
resources and competences]’’ (Langlois, 1992, p. 113).
The ﬁrm is always in need of some things – things that can only be found
outside ﬁrm’s boundaries. The ﬁrm then chooses often to get those things
done through business relationships or arm’s-length relations, instead of
internalizing things through vertical integration (of counterparts). Assume,
for instance, that the ﬁrm demands a particular set of resources and
competences that are dissimilar but closely complementary to those owned
and controlled internally and that this set of resources and competences is
externally available, that is, housed within a counterpart’s boundaries. Why
should the ﬁrm internalize those resources and competences or instead
develop them internally ab initio? No advantage seems to result for the ﬁrm
if those resources and competences are brought within boundaries – or in
other words, beneﬁts of employing hierarchical or market governance
structures are less than (or/and sacriﬁces are greater than) the ones attained
in a relational governance structure. As Barney (1999) stresses, the ﬁrm
usually takes into consideration the costliness of acquisition (or sale) and/or
of internal development – and in many cases, costs of buying (or selling) in
markets and/or of organic development are likely to exceed the costs of
access and exploration through vertical cooperation.
4.2.3. Business Relationships and the Evolution of Corporate Vertical
Boundaries: The Firm’s ‘‘Make-or-Buy-or-Access’’ Decisions
Vertical boundaries circumscribe internal resources, competences, and
activities of the ﬁrm, therefore demarcating the things that the ﬁrm does
from the things that gets done by suppliers and customers. Vertical
boundaries delimit corporate nature and deﬁne at large corporate scope.
These boundaries are prone to display two features: changeability and
fuzziness (Araujo et al., 1999; Hakansson & Snehota, 1989). First, vertical
boundaries are changeable, being subject to expansion or reduction over
time (e.g., in accord with ‘‘make-or-buy’’ decisions taken by the ﬁrm).
Second, vertical boundaries are fuzzy owing to the continued existence of
business relationships and the signiﬁcance of external resources and
competences for corporate survival or growth. Given the extent of interﬁrm
cooperation, it is difﬁcult to trace at least unequivocally ‘‘‘where the ﬁrm
FILIPE J. SOUSA AND LUIS M. DE CASTRO390
ends’ and ‘where suppliers and customers begin.’’’ And it is meaningless to
draw vertical boundaries just by bearing in mind the ‘‘ownership and
control’’ criteria, as if only internal resources, competences, and activities
are included within the ﬁrm’s boundaries. Vertical boundaries not only
separate the ﬁrm from suppliers and customers but also bring these
cooperating parties together – boundaries display ‘‘buffer’’ and ‘‘bridge’’
functions (Araujo, Dubois, & Gadde, 2003; Thompson, 1967).
The dual impact of business relationships on (the inputs to and most
importantly) the things that the ﬁrm does and the things that gets done is
naturally implicated in the exercise of (and the effects resulting from) access
and innovation relationship powers and liabilities. Business relationships are
bound to impact the ﬁrm’s vertical boundaries, in particular by exerting a
substantial inﬂuence over where the (changeable and blurred) vertical
boundaries are to be drawn. That impact is corroborated by theoretical
and empirical research conducted by MAN theorists (Araujo et al., 2003;
Ford, Cotton, Farmer, Gross, & Wilkinson, 1993; Mota & de Castro, 2004,
2005) as well as other scholars and researchers (Barney, 1999; Langlois &
Robertson, 1995). By keeping that impact in mind, make-or-buy decisions of
the ﬁrm – about which resources, competences, and activities reside (or are to
be brought within) and which ones remain outside vertical boundaries – are
transformed. Delimitation of corporate vertical boundaries is not reduced to
a series of discrete make-or-buy decisions. Contrary to what is traditionally
assumed (e.g., by Williamson, 1981, 1975), those decisions are not static,
independent, or dichotomous. The ﬁrm’s make-or-buy decisions are closely
and dynamically connected to each other over time (e.g., the decision to
‘‘make X’’ may imply the decision of not to ‘‘buy Y’’ later on) and most
importantly, incorporate a third option, ‘‘access’’ (Gibbons, 2001). As an
illustrative example, consider the ﬁrm’s decision to integrate supplier A with
negative and null repercussions, respectively, on the business relationship
with supplier B and on the arm’s-length relation with customer C.
The ﬁrm is not always obliged to either develop or internalize all the
external resources and competences that needs – to do the things that
the ﬁrm does or intends to do in the future – since the ﬁrm has usually the
possibility of (continually) accessing and exploring those resources and
competences (whenever residing outside corporate boundaries) through
cooperation with suppliers and customers.
Boundary decisions of the ﬁrm are hence about ‘‘making-or-buying-or-
accessing,’’ that is to say: internally developing resources, competences,
and activities; acquiring resources, competences, and activities (through
engagement in arm’s-length relations with or even vertically integrating
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counterparts); or accessing and exploring external resources and compe-
tences (through development of business relationships), respectively. One
can identify an alternative to make or buy conventional options, namely
access to and exploration of external resources and competences (through
vertical cooperation), and that alternative allows the possibility to expand
(or reduce) the nature and scope of the ﬁrm while leaving unaltered
corporate vertical boundaries. Although opting for make or buy or access
is necessarily conducive to enlargement of the ﬁrm’s nature and scope,
the making or buying options effect the expansion of corporate vertical
boundaries while the accessing option leaves those boundaries unaltered.
The nature and scope of the ﬁrm are therefore not deﬁned once and for all
by corporate vertical boundaries (given that corporate nature and scope
can be enlarged or reduced while vertical boundaries remain the same,
for instance, when the ﬁrm develops or terminates business relationships,
respectively) but are largely the outcome of multiple and complexly
interrelated make-or-buy-or-access decisions taken over time.
In other words, the structure, powers, and liabilities of the ﬁrm are
likely to be affected to a great extent by the structure, powers, and
liabilities of business relationships that the ﬁrm develops and sustains with
counterparts. So, the primary constituents of the ﬁrm and the things that
the ﬁrm does by itself and gets done by others (i.e., corporate resources,
competences, and activities respectively) are all strongly impacted upon
by business relationships established, nurtured, and maintained with
several suppliers and customers over time. The conspicuous yet unarticu-
lated impact of business relationships on corporate nature and scope
over time is another potential cause of relationship signiﬁcance – in addition
to the aforementioned cause that emphasizes the effects resulting
from exercise of relationship powers and liabilities and being appropriated
by the ﬁrm.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This conceptual paper builds explicitly upon a critical realist meta-theory,
thus acknowledging the largely mind-independence and openness of the
business world composed of a myriad of entities (endowed with own
structures and exhibiting powers and liabilities, all somewhat intercon-
nected) and events (likely to be brought about whenever powers and
liabilities are put to work, under varying contingencies). The authors
attempt here to perform an exploration into the causes of relationship
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signiﬁcance, that signiﬁcance being a pervasive and yet insufﬁciently
inquired event of the business world.
5.1. Theoretical Contributions
5.1.1. The Business World: Firms, Markets, and Networks
The paper provides a realist-inspired view of the business world, a part of
the social world that one inhabits. Firms are complexly structured
and powerful entities, the most prominent of the entities existing in the
business world given that are responsible for bringing into existence
other entities (notably, inter-organizational relationships, business relation-
ships, and even networks and markets) as well as some events (namely
arm’s-length relations). Firms comprise a diversity of components, the most
important of which are resources and competences. Owing to such intricate
structures, ﬁrms are endowed with several powers and liabilities and
thus capable of performing activities and producing outputs, cash ﬂows, or
proﬁts.
Given the limitedness of corporate resources and competences, ﬁrms are
prone to embark on different kinds of linkages with one another, mostly
through vertical cooperation but also through exchange. Vertical coopera-
tion is more prevalent than horizontal cooperation in the business world,
that is, business relationships are more frequently developed and sustained
by ﬁrms than inter-organizational relationships. Business relationships are
entities that exhibit an intricate structure (e.g., are long-lasting, ruled by
informal contracts, entail multiplex interpersonal contacts, and so forth)
and therefore a sixfold set of powers and liabilities (namely access, control,
efﬁciency, innovation, stability, and networking). Networks are entangled
webs of connected business relationships and ﬁrms.
Exchange, ruled by the price mechanism, is also commonly found in the
business world. These interﬁrm relations at arm’s-length distance are mere
on-off events constituting, together with other elements that frame and
govern such transactions (e.g., technologies, marketplaces, and contractual
rules), other entities of the business world (namely markets).
Firms’ interrelatedness (through cooperation and exchange) implies that
corporate structures, powers, and liabilities are necessarily connected to one
another. Corporate powers and liabilities are exercised under particular
contingencies, especially business relationships and networks but also
arm’s-length relations and markets.
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5.1.2. Potential Causes of Relationship Signiﬁcance
Relationship signiﬁcance pertains to the inﬂuence that business relationships
have on corporate survival or growth. Relationship signiﬁcance exists even
when the ﬁrm is totally unaware of it – though, as the authors acknowledge
earlier, a potential and mediate inﬂuence of corporate perceptions or
knowledge (and subsequent decisions and actions) on relationship signiﬁcance
exists.
Relationship signiﬁcance is a basic conceptual cornerstone of MAN
theory. In general MAN theorists consider relationship signiﬁcance to be
(almost) an axiom, taking in uncritical fashion that signiﬁcance to be a
corollary of the ubiquitous existence of business relationships in the business
world. The authors challenge here such a foundationalist position for the
mere existence of business relationships does not mandate automatically
relationship signiﬁcance (to the ﬁrm or any other counterpart). Despite
business relationships being potentially signiﬁcant to the ﬁrm, not all those
vertical cooperative linkages are so all the time. Signiﬁcance is not a given
attribute of each and every business relationship of the ﬁrm. Relationship
signiﬁcance is not a regularity of the business world, being instead a
potential event that may be brought about by certain causes and enduring
for the most part regardless of any perception or knowledge (even that
of any of the parties involved). Relationship signiﬁcance varies along
a continuum (rather than being a dichotomy), since one is able to ﬁnd a
diversity of business relationships in the business world, ranging from
absolutely insigniﬁcant through lowly signiﬁcant and averagely signiﬁcant
to highly signiﬁcant ones.
The authors’ main claims here are that relationship signiﬁcance is brought
about by either or both of two causes: ﬁrst, relationship powers and
liabilities are put to work under changeable contingencies (e.g., connected
business relationships) and as a consequence beneﬁts in excess of sacriﬁces
(i.e., relationship value) are appropriated by the ﬁrm or relationship beneﬁts
are respectively greater than and/or relationship sacriﬁces are less than
beneﬁts and sacriﬁces expected by the ﬁrm (when takes into account beneﬁts
and sacriﬁces obtained in similar business relationships in the past) or
eventually resulting from alternatives (i.e., substitute business relationships
or alternative governance structures such as hierarchies and markets); and
second, the effects resulting from the exercise of access and innovation
powers and liabilities of business relationships impact upon corporate
structure, powers, and liabilities, that is to say, impact upon internal and
external resources and competences at the ﬁrm’s disposal (nature) and the
activities that performs (scope).
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The latter of these causes demands particular attention for is in line with
the intuitive view that business relationships are privileged means by which
the powers and liabilities of counterparts are made available to the ﬁrm for
access and exploration. Participation in business relationships (and the
effects resulting from the exercise of relationship powers and liabilities,
in particular the access and innovation ones) can help the ﬁrm to alter
own structure (e.g., to modify internal resources or explore new external
competences) and as a result – with considerable importance to corporate
survival or growth – to modify corporate powers and liabilities (e.g., to
increase efﬁciency in the performance of marketing activities).
5.2. Managerial Implications
The authors’ analysis here is of a conceptual kind. First, the indisputability
of relationship signiﬁcance is called into question and then a causal account
of potential causes for that signiﬁcance is provided. The main objectives of
this paper are description and explanation, not prediction. The authors
attempt to answer a major research question: ‘‘why are business relationships
signiﬁcant to some extent to the ﬁrm?’’ or in other words, ‘‘how is
relationship signiﬁcance brought about?’’ Since the causes of relationship
signiﬁcance are only tentatively advanced here, only tentative answers can be
given. And no deﬁnitive answers can be provided to questions such as ‘‘which
business relationships are in general signiﬁcant to the ﬁrm? to what extent?’’
or ‘‘is the business relationship with counterpart A highly signiﬁcant to the
ﬁrm at present? when is that degree of relationship signiﬁcance likely to
change?’’ For even fallible knowledge on causes of relationship, signiﬁcance
can give the ability to offer ‘‘tendential predictions’’ about the event’s future
occurrence (e.g., ‘‘why is it likely that relationship signiﬁcance is ever brought
about in the ﬁrm’s relationship with supplier A?’’) or issue normative
guidelines (e.g., ‘‘what needs to be done in order to increase the actual degree
of signiﬁcance in the business relationship with customer B?’’).
That the main contributions are here theoretical does not imply that
managerial implications are entirely absent from the paper. The authors aim
to add directly to a more robust knowledge about – and indirectly to a
more effective and efﬁcient management of – the business relationships
and networks in which the ﬁrm is deeply embedded. Given that business
relationships differ in the relative degree of signiﬁcance (over time) and the
ﬁrm is endowed with limited resources and competences (and consequently,
can be highly involved with only a limited number of counterparts), ‘‘there is
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a need for giving certain [business] relationships priority over others’
(Hakansson & Snehota, 1995, p. 131). Easton (1992, p. 25) asserts the same
point: ‘‘[The ﬁrm] must choose how much, and in what fashion, it will devote
to each [business] relationship, potential or actual.’’ Prioritizing, however, is
not only about assigning both high priorities to certain business relationships
and low priorities to others. The ﬁrm needs to get (similar) priorities from
the counterparts with which interacts through those business relationships
(Hakansson & Snehota, 1995, p. 202). The ﬁrm is likely to employ some
criteria when prioritizing business relationships. A possible criterion is the
degree of trust and commitment of the counterpart, explicitly declared or
somehow inferred from the counterpart’s behavior – for instance, the ﬁrm
assigns a higher priority only to business relationships with trustworthy and
highly committed counterparts (Hakansson & Snehota, 1995, p. 265).
Another very reasonable criterion which is likely to be used by the ﬁrm is
(the mostly perceived) relationship signiﬁcance, either presently or in the
future. To prioritize business relationships boils down to ‘‘single out the
signiﬁcant ones’’ (Hakansson & Snehota, 1995, p. 125).
The ﬁrm is advised to be rather selective in the development and
maintenance of business relationships. That is, different priorities are
(or should be) attributed to and attained in differently signiﬁcant business
relationships. This means that the ﬁrm needs to effect a differentiated
‘‘relationship posture’’ in business relationships (Gadde & Snehota, 2000).
Relationship posture pertains to the ﬁrm’s degree of involvement in a
particular business relationship. The best way for the ﬁrm to ‘‘make the
most’’ of diverse business relationships is to establish, nurture, and
sustain both low- and high-involvement relationships, committing lesser
and greater amounts of resources and competences respectively to such
relationships.
The ﬁrm is in general strongly committed to business relationships
that are (or can become) highly signiﬁcant. A low-involvement posture, on
the contrary, is likely to be adopted by the ﬁrm in business relationships that
are (or merely perceived as of) low in signiﬁcance. The message is clear:
business relationships should be managed in varied ways by the ﬁrm, in
accordance with (present and/or future) degree of relationship signiﬁcance.
Differentiation in relationship posture, in essence relationship and network
management (Moller & Halinen, 1999; Ritter, Wilkinson, & Johnston,
2004), can be implemented only when the ﬁrm is able to identify which
business relationships are (or will be) signiﬁcant and to what degree and
most importantly, understand why that is the case. Only by probing into
relationship signiﬁcance and identifying tentatively potential causes can the
FILIPE J. SOUSA AND LUIS M. DE CASTRO396
ﬁrm acquire or improve corporate understanding concerning the individual
and collective management of business relationships.
Independently of the ﬁeld of study, advances in knowledge go hand in
hand with improvements in practice. ‘‘By extending and improving ﬁrms’
understanding and sensitivity regarding relationship and network issues,
better performing ﬁrms and networks will emerge’’ (Wilkinson & Young,
2002, p. 127).
5.3. Limitations and Future Research
5.3.1. Interplay Between Business Relationships and Inter-Organizational
Relationships
No matter how thorough research efforts are, some issues are unconsciously
neglected or intended set aside by scholars and researchers. Much is
inevitably left unaddressed in any piece of research, and this paper is no
exception. Time and other resources available play a crucial role in the
incompleteness of research as well as the usually narrow foci of interest of
scholars and researchers. The authors address in turn the aspects that are
somewhat overlooked by or only brieﬂy discussed in this paper.
One is certain to ﬁnd among the multiple entities of the business world,
inter-organizational relationships that the ﬁrm develops and maintains for
the most part with competitors. Interﬁrm horizontal cooperation differs from
vertical cooperative relationships in structure, powers, and liabilities respects.
Inter-organizational relationships are often ruled by explicit contracts, short-
lived, and aiming at clear objectives (e.g., new product co-development). The
horizontal and vertical cooperative relationships of the ﬁrm are necessarily
interrelated to some extent: despite being sought for diverse motives, inter-
organizational relationships and business relationships ‘‘compete’’ for the
ﬁrm’s limited resources and competences, in particular resources and
competences dedicated to effecting cooperation with counterparts.
Inasmuch as ﬁrms are responsible for bringing about business relation-
ships and inter-organizational relationships, the structure, powers, and
liabilities of both business relationships and inter-organizational relation-
ships are heavily affected by (and affect) the structure, powers, and liabilities
of ﬁrms responsible for the establishment, development, and maintenance
of those cooperative relationships. For instance, the ﬁrm’s commitment to
consolidate the structure and thus powers of inter-organizational relation-
ships are likely conducive to the absence of commitment to strengthen
the structure and thus powers of business relationships, on account of the
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limitedness of corporate resources and competences. The interaction
between the structure, powers, and liabilities of both inter-organizational
relationships and business relationships is not here given the attention that
probably deserves.
5.3.2. Relationship Signiﬁcance: A Subject on Need of Further Research
The absence of empirical research and ﬁndings is a shortcoming recurrently
pointed out to conceptual papers. Although ‘‘research is likely to involve a
division of labor between theorists and empirical researchers’’ (Ackroyd,
2004, p. 158), unpretentious scholars and researchers are in general expected
to immerse in empirical sources and gather evidences to corroborate or
refute a postulated hypothesis or theory, by undertaking case studies or
surveys or employing any other methodological tools. Those scholars and
researchers are not urged to devise, extend, or improve the current state-of-
the-art of scientiﬁc knowledge by using conceptualization. Contrary to
positivist conceptions of science, (critical) realists take purely conceptual
analyses – such as the authors’ analysis here – not to be sterile, for such
analyses can help to shed light on matters of interest. Tsoukas (1989, p. 558)
synthesizes this point very eloquently, by claiming that both ‘‘up in the
clouds’’ (i.e., analytical) and ‘‘down to earth’’ (i.e., empirical) research are
necessary.
This paper has called into question the taken-for-grantedness of
relationship signiﬁcance, providing a tentative account of potential causes
bringing about this notorious event of the business world. One of the paper’s
major thrusts is to trigger some discussion over the (usually taken-for-
granted) relationship signiﬁcance, expecting that a near future contemplates
more conceptual and empirical research, with each feeding back the other.
First, it is desirable that other conceptual works on the subject are carried
out. This paper is only a starting point and the authors hope that the
arguments here can draw enough interest to be analytically reviewed,
criticized, modiﬁed, or extended (e.g., by resorting to other bodies of
knowledge). Second, relationship signiﬁcance needs to be subject to
empirical investigations, for instance, concerning the heterogeneous
contingencies faced by the ﬁrm (namely intricate networks of business
interactions and faceless markets of transactions) and how potential causes
of relationship signiﬁcance evolve, are put to work under (and interact over
time with) these changing contingencies.
A diversity of more speciﬁc questions may guide empirical research:
‘‘in what ways do prevailing contingent conditions (e.g., relationship
connectedness) impact on the signiﬁcance of the ﬁrm’s business relationship
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with customer A?’’ or ‘‘which dominant powers presently at work,
bring about the signiﬁcance of the ﬁrm’s business relationship with
supplier B?’’ ‘‘what enhances or impairs the exercise of the ‘networking’
power of the business relationship with supplier C?’’ or ‘‘how do access and
control powers of the ﬁrm’s business relationship with customer D, interact
over time?’’
In a nutshell, a (critical realist) spiral-like approach to theory and
evidence is as opposite here as in social sciences at large. Analytical
explanations of the world’s causes need to be complemented with intensive
case studies of causes’ operation under a diverse set of contingencies. So far,
relationship signiﬁcance can be adequately depicted as a ‘‘black box’’ on the
grounds that its causes are for the most part left unidentiﬁed. MAN
theorists are therefore urged to open up tentatively that box, by describing
and explaining the structure, powers, and liabilities potentially responsible
for bringing about relationship signiﬁcance. That is what the authors
attempt to do here.
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